The political crisis in Turkey is deepening and the prime minister, Mr Erdogan, it seems can do nothing to reverse it. Since a corruption probe led to three MPs resigning from key posts, and a cabinet reshuffle, the damage has yet to be contained. A total of seven MPs have resigned and Erdogan called a meeting with Media chiefs on Saturday in an attempt to control the message. But with social media being such a popular mode of communication it may be attempting the impossible. On Friday the deputy PM Bulent Arinc criticised members of AKP, his own party, for tweeting 'too much'. He used the words 'citir citir' to describe them, which literally means 'crackle crackle'. Within twenty four hours of the criticism by the deputy PM a member of AKP tweeted simply 'citir citir', poking fun at Mr Arinc. If nothing else, it shows a growing descent within the party. There once was a time when AKP didn't criticise itself. Happening at this time, it goes to show just how big a challenge the prime minister is facing. There are a number of scenarios unfolding in Turkey at the moment:
ONE: President Abdullah Gul will return to steer the party and Erdogan will be filed away into the depths of the presidential palace, a largely symbolic role. For the first time since the crisis began, president Gul spoke yesterday, not that he offered a way out of the stand off between elements of the Turkish state sympathetic to Gulen, and/or Erdogan. The response from some Turks, 'at least we know our president is still alive', a reference to Gul's hands off approach to the current crisis, but then there's not much a president can do. It's a post with no executive power. And while it may be a dead end job, the presidential post in its current form with no executive power may be a saving grace for Mr Erdogan, who has managed to alienate himself from his allies at home and abroad. This may secure the support of the 'cemaat/community' the name used for Gulen sympathisers, guided by their leader who still prefers an Islamist party in power.
TWO: Erdogan will judge by himself his chances in a general elections by results in the upcoming local elections scheduled for March. General elections are planned for 2015, but unless he is able to perform a miracle it seems difficult that this will be the way forward. The corruption scandal has unleashed a wave of criticism. It has opened Pandora's Box as they say and all of his failures are now being judged. On domestic and foreign policy, Gezi Park and Syria are leading the debate. This week Turkish media reported a truck carrying arms crossed the Syrian border after customs police were told not to stop it. The foreign minister is reported to be insisting that Assad be toppled, in contrast to what most in the international community now believe since the US strike didn't happen. The Reyhanli bombing which left over 50 dead in a Turkish border town, a spill over from the conflict next door, has not been forgotten here. The relationship with the US is also on trial. Most Turks believe Washington plays an influential role in who their leader is and Erdogan has distanced himself from the US and Israel, and therefore from the cemaat. Gulen lives in the US and harbours no emotion towards the Palestinian cause. The 'one minute' public humiliation of the Israeli president at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident that saw nine activists killed on an aid ferry sailing to break the Gaza blockade, a ferry that was sanctioned by the Turkish government and sailed from Turkey, are both examples of where Erdogan went wrong for the cemaat. Erdogan's ambitions are neo-Ottoman in terms of empire building, but in contrast to the Gulen vision of Turkish Islam, Erdogan's dream is to become the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood regionally. He sees himself as the father of a successful political party rooted in Islam, a model for North Africa and the Middle East. These acts of open defiance against Israel earned him kudos on the Arab street, but that hasn't been enough to save him. The events of Syria have shown that the PM miscalculated his power in this regards. These dreams are now over.
THREE: The main opposition party, the CHP, secular republicans, will form an alliance with the cemaat - an unlikely bed fellow, but it looks like this may become a plausible way forward. Mr Kilicdaroglu, head of the party, visited the US, where Gulen lives, a week before the corruption probe started. Many commentators believe that they may have made a deal and the cemaat will help the CHP play for the centre ground in general elections. There are signs that this may be true. Mustafa Sarigul, a popular guy in his own district of Istanbul, will run for mayor in the local elections. If he does well, he may become the new face of the CHP in the general elections. The current leader Kilicdaroglu is Alevi, a factor that can't be ignored. It will prevent some Sunnis from voting CHP, the ones that are fed up with Erdogan. So a change of leadership for the CHP would be a strategy that might help them at the ballot box. Kilicdaroglu seems to have grasped the moment to make these changes is now. A real break from the past CHP under Deniz Baykal, who lost eleven elections and clung to power. This new formula may give Erdogan a run for his money as Sarigul is charismatic and business orientated.
The breakdown of Turkish core voters can be loosely defined: AKP 30%, CHP 20%, MHP 10% (nationalists), BDP 10% (Kurdish), 30% undecided liberals/ conservative Kurds and cemaat (centre right). If Erdogan loses the conservative Kurdish voters and the cemaat he may find it hard to rule with a majority and the notion that he would work within a coalition is one that doesn't inspire.
Something that has recently hit the headlines is Turkey's relations with its regional rival, Iran. If commentators are right, then the P5+1 may look to Turkey for any falters it experiences with the nuclear negotiations in Geneva. A gold for oil scandal and reports that one in six companies opened in Turkey last year were Iranian, implies Ankara has been propping up the Iranian economy at a time when tougher economic sanctions were part of the P5+1 strategy to bring Iran to the negotiating table.
At war with Syria, at odds with the military in Egypt, sinking into a sticky situation with Iran, Turkey's foreign policy is in disarray just as much as AKP's house is at home. Given the list of miscalculations by Erdogan over the past twelve months, it looks less likely that he will come out of this ahead, but this is Turkey and politics are dynamic here. Corruption is a major problem, bribes are part of the business culture, but the fact that it is now out in the open is a development that Erdogan can not flee from. The coming months are going to be critical not only for the PM but also for his party should it want to survive and thrive once more.
